The paper shows, on the basis of longitudinal analysis of the British press, that public opinion of genetic research and biotechnology varies over two long-term waves: from 1946 to 1972 and from 1973 to the 2000s. Each wave shows a nested phase of enthusiasm and of scepticism. During the first wave biological news has little salience and evaluation parallels the attitudes to general science. During the second wave genetic engineering becomes a major news item, and its phase of evaluation separates from that of general science and technology. While general science improves its public profile, biotechnology becomes publicly controversial during the 1990s. Public perceptions, as far as data is available, follows the changing trends of the press with some lag. For both waves of public sentiment the paper highlights events and topics that fuelled public imagination and that led to the present mix of controversies over genetic technology in food production, biomedicine and law enforcement. The watershed events of 1996 (gm soya) and 1997 (Dolly the sheep) did not initiate the trend changes which started already in mid 1980s, but catalysed an already established trend towards more sceptical sentiments in the late 1990s.
Opinion polls and studies of public sentiments towards genetic research in all its modes and applications abound, but only in recent year when public controversy has become apparent. Long-term continuous data streams on public opinion and public sentiment on anything is generally hard to come by. Outside voting intentions, the labour market, fear of crime, and the consumer climate, the social sciences have few established 'weather stations' that take readings of public sentiments comparable to the innumerous readings of temperature, humidity and wind speed that go into weather forecasts. The rule seems to be: no controversy, no opinion poll. For the longterm study of public sentiments towards genetic research we suffer exactly that shortage of readings, but we may be able to compensate the handicap by resorting to longitudinal analysis of newsprint. The present paper analyses the trajectory of genetics in the British press between 1946 and 2002. The paper makes several conceptual, substantive and methodological points.
Representation matters
Despite post-modern ruminations of a 'crisis of representation', the presumption of this paper is that representation of biotechnology matters. 'Representation' has however several meanings. First, it means to speak on behalf of somebody, either in court for a client or in parliament for a constituency. Secondly, it means to collect data from a population in a unbiased manner ensuring that each member has the same chance of being selected (this meaning is part of our methodology, see below). And finally it refers to re-presenting something that is absent with semiotic tools such as iconic images, indexical markers, or word symbols, expressions or stories. And absent means being presently at a different location or a matter of imagination, or having had a past existence, or having a future as a not-yet-being. Representations thus accommodate reality and are a potential space, past and future. I will use the term 'representation' mainly in the latter semiotic sense. Furthermore, representations are no private matter, but communicated among people. They are the resources we all use to make sense of the world and world events (see Wagner & Hayes, 2005; Jovchelovitch, 1996; Farr & Moscovici, 1984) . Hence, representations of biotechnology, the focus of this paper, are not epiphenomena of a techno-political fait-accompli, but they are an integral part of the public sphere that, by focusing attention, motivate and legitimate or question and resist this new technology (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999) . A convenient data stream, albeit not the only one, for the reconstruction of representations is mass media reportage. A key problems is how representations come about, are sustained, and change over time in any public forum.
Representations of any public issue are sponsored and contested by social actors, and in this contest we like to think of an emerging technology as a quasi-social movement that competes for public attention and thus enhances or shortens its future (see Bauer, 2002b; Bauer & Gaskell, 2000) .
The analysis of media representations is complicated by the double nature of mass mediation: expression of public opinion on one hand, and lever of social influence on the other. Mass media are both means and mediator. Our daily news in Britain is in a classical sense public opinion. It is the expression of a constitutionally protected freedom of speech about matters of common interest in a competitive market of opinions.
i But news and reportage is also influential in setting the agenda and framing the public opinion process: thus they are means to tell the people what to think about, and how to think about matters public. The mass media are the targets of strategic controls and thus prone to explicit and implicit bias.
Content analysis of news makes two contributions. First, it shows what many actors were perceiving, or at least were able to, as public opinion at the time. Politicians, business people, civil servants and scientists attend to newsprint and thus encounter public opinion. For many the news is a marker of public opinion. This opinion is selected and elaborated by the daily practices of journalists and news production in a competitive market for audience attention (Hansen, 1993 
The public sphere, topic salience and framing
News is a dramatic narrative centred on events, actions, persons and a moral point (Schudson, 2003; Burke, 1945) . Equally, science news offers the reader a personalised drama in and around science and technology. This idea of 'drama' has several implications. Firstly, it avoids the expectation that news reportage is isomorphic to scientific activities and is therefore to be judged by its 'accuracy'. To the contrary science news as dramatic representation of science is to be judged by its rules of operation: the selection and elaboration of events according to news values, and by its contribution to the formation of public opinion (Neidhardt, 1993) .
Representations of science in newsprint are contributions in and for the public sphere, neither primarily true nor false, nor irrelevant, nor educational, nor entertaining. News foremost dramatises events to synchronise and modulate public attention, provides frames of interpretation and stimulates everyday conversations (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999 We distinguish public opinion from the public sphere on the one hand, and from opinion measurements on the other; three distinct but related concepts. The public sphere is an historical structure of forums where reasonable opinion emerge on matters of general concern, subject to the constraints of a ideal of free speech (Habermas, 1989) . The public sphere requires constant vigilance against tendencies of decline. Within a public sphere, public opinion is a process that can be studied by its outcomes, classically a vote or an opinion poll. However, it is important to avoid the fallacy of operationalism and define public opinion by what public opinion polls measure. I research 'public opinion' as covariance of mass media contents and public perceptions over time. Like other measures, once visualised, they offer 'movable immobiles' of otherwise intangible phenomena. Secondly, the notion of drama focuses attention to the stage setting and the plot. The setting opens space, and the plot links acts and actors into complications and offers a moral. Here I consider two elements of such drama: the space given to and the evaluation of the act of 'genetics'.
Methodology
The long-term trends of the press coverage are reconstructed from two research databases of British media coverage. We iii consider the number of articles in a single newspaper as indicator of public salience and the mean evaluation of genetics and biotechnology across the articles as an index of public attitudes. Our method is content analysis (e.g. Bauer, 2000; Krippendorff, 1980) . With two simple indicators we characterise the unfolding public drama of genetics over the past 50 years. The value of this procedure is the simplicity and ease with which longitudinal data streams can be constructed. If public opinion is a process, then its faithful representation must at least be a dynamic picture.
Data for the period 1946-73
The database 'Science and Technology in the British Press, 1946-92' comprises newspaper articles dating from 1946 to 1992 (see Bauer et al., 1995) . The corpus is a probability sample of press articles, stratified by year and newspaper including the (code Q18) between 1 (= discourse of great promise) and 5 (= discourse of great concern). These ratings are recoded so that the neutral position is 0 (-2 to +2). Note 
Data for the period 1973-99
The international project 'Biotechnology and the Public' conducted press monitoring of biotechnology news in the elite press for the period between 1973 and 2002 (see Bauer & Howard, 2004) = not applicable; 1= slightly negative; 5 = discourse of great concern) and positive rating (Q23b: 0 not applicable; 1= slightly positive; 5 = discourse of great promise).
The evaluation index is defined as the difference of positive and negative ratings.
Note that on average the post-1973 ratings are positive (mean = 1.09; std dev = 1.90; n= 802).
We consider these ratings functionally equivalent before and after 1973. For purposes of analysing long-term trends we calibrate the two series. The overlap of the two data series from 1974 to 1992 helps to validate both intensity and valuation figures in the two series. We standardize the evaluation scores in both data series to their long-term average. The graphics below show the annual deviations from the long-term average (mean = 0, std dev = 1). The standard score of 1972 is slightly lower than that 1974;
to link the two time-series we raise the pre-1973 series by adding a correction of (+)0.2 to standard score. This avoids the wrong impression of a 'sudden jump' in 1972-74, which is likely an artefact of using different measures.
Public perceptions: being optimistic about biotechnology
The optimism index is based on the UK data of Eurobarometer, an instrument of the 1946 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 no The picture shows two waves of growing and declining enthusiasm for genetics. Until 1960 the evaluation of genetics is ever more positive to turn more negative in the early 1970s. Then again until 1981 the news is ever more positive, only to reverse after the mid 1980s and into the 1990s. As biotechnology news expands, the discourse becomes more varied and more sceptical (note: the graphs denote deviations from the long-term mean and not the level of evaluation). However, despite these trend changes and contrary to polemical perceptions of media coverage, the attitude of the British press stays positive (see Bauer et al., 1998 process or product (Jasanoff, 2005) .
How does the path of biotechnology compare to that of science in general (see Bauer, 2000; Bauer et al. 2006a) . Over the post-war period the biomedical sciences (biology, medicine) displace the physical sciences (physics, geology, chemistry, astronomy) in public attention. Science reporting moves from the 'rocket-scalpel' to the 'genemeteorite' complex (Bauer, 1998) . In those days, most science news is in celebratory summaries of papers published in Nature and Science. Such news coverage tends to increase the public awareness of research and the citation counts of the authors by up to 70% over the next 10 years (see Philips, 1991) . With an average of one article per month genetics news is insignificant compared to that of the physical sciences and to what will become the level of genetics news in the 1990s. Science news, and there is increasing amounts in the late 1950s and early 1960s, focuses on atom bombs and, after the Geneva 'Atoms for Peace' conference of 1955, increasingly on civil nuclear power and its potentials.
Britain is a major player, linked the world's first civil nuclear power station to the electricity grid in 1956 (Calder Hall) and enjoys the 'special relationship' with the US based on their joint nuclear capability. Genetics remains marginal news, but at times its surfs the news issue with stories on nuclear fallout and the risks of genetic mutations at various levels of radiation exposure (see Weart, 1988, 200ff) . Gould, 1996) . Note, that these are also the beginnings of the challenge to the neo-positivist and Mertonian canons in the philosophy and sociology of science.
After 1973: the business phase in industrial mode
The universities and private capital in the 1980s and 1990s (Haber, 1996) . Many of these young companies go to the stock market in the 1990s, which leads to a flood of hyperbole business news promising a lucrative future to potential investors. 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 in 1978, 1991, 1993, 1996, 1999 and 2002 (left scale) .
Media
On the other hand, the group of scientists involved in recombinant DNA research publish an open letter (Berg et al., 1974) simultaneously in Nature and Science pointing to potential hazards of their research. They call for a moratorium until the risks of rDNA research are defined and contained. The 1975 Asilomar conference in California discusses these points in a semi-public forum. Similar discussions take placed in Britain and elsewhere. This is a historical first: hitherto scientists have been concerned with breaking the social constraints on their enquiries, now the avantguard blows the whistle on themselves (Yoxen 1983) . Initially the concerns are laboratory and public health hazards, later environmental and developmental risks, and the ethics of such designs which put at disposition the very nature of 'human nature' (Rose, 2001 ).
Both streams of events prove historically significant, however, have little immediate public visibility as shown in figure 3 . We find increased coverage by 1977-78, a dip in press evaluation, and a moderate level of optimism over these new developments in public perceptions; 38% of British think rDNA research is worthwhile. Soon the scepticism of Berg et al. and Asilomar will be displaced by the celebration of scientific progress and economic prospects of biotechnology (Yoxen, 1983) , and the big story of 1977-78 is the birth of Louise Brown, the first test-tube baby (Turney, 1998) . In the 1970s, reproduction is part of the discourse of 'biology turned into a technology'. But Britain at the time worried about many other things: energy crisis, the winter of discontent, the punks, high inflation and several elections.
By 1980 the new British government of Margaret Thatcher officially recognises, as did the OECD and others, that new biotechnology is the future. This is reflected in the rising enthusiasm in the press. Coverage grows exponentially and continued to do so to its peak in 1999, rising from a monthly news item to five or six stories a day in a single newspaper. The year 1984, the test year for Orwell's dark predictions, sees the arrival of 'DNA fingerprinting', a British invention. Henceforth crime news carries genetic references. The identification of the remains of the former Russian royal family became 'gene talk' in the early 1990s (Durant, Hansen & Bauer, 1996) . In 1990 the European Community regulates the release of genetically modified organisms into the environment with leading British input, and the debate cools off: reduced salience but stable evaluations. At the time, many observers felt that the controversy over biotechnology, as far as there ever was one, was now settled and closed. In hind-sight, we now know it occurred differently.
For the 1990s we can compare public perceptions and mass media discourse. After 1984 the media enthusiasm cools off, while optimism in public perceptions continues to rise until 1993. Optimistic attitudes increase from about one third in 1978 to over 50% of the population by 1993. Thereafter optimism shrinks to 30% by 1999 and remains at that level by 2002. This trend reversal in public perceptions appears to follow that of the mass media discourse, but with a considerable time lag. However, our data is not conclusive here. I am not aware of any public perception data of biotechnology in the mid 1980s, when media enthusiasm was at its peak. A hypothetical poll in 1985 might show equally enthusiastic attitudes as displayed in the media discourse, and thus show a closely parallel decline in optimism in media and perceptions from the mid 1980s onwards. On the other hand 1985 is the year when the Royal Society laments the deficient public appreciation of science in its famous report (Royal Society, 1985) , which, if the tone of that report can be considered evidential, would suggest that public attitudes did not mirror the media discourse at the time.
1994 sees the arrival of genetically modified (gm) food products on supermarket shelves, the CALGENE Flavr Savr tomato in the US and the ZENECA tomato paste in Britain. Both products have a short life cycle, less because of consumer rejectionconsumer were given little opportunity to make decisions -more because of corporate reasons (Martineau, 2001) . The first consensus conference on plant biotechnology takes place in 1994. Experimenting with public participation, a model of public deliberation imported from Denmark (see Joss & Durant, 1995; Einsiedel, 2001 spreads through the mass media of Europe (Bauer et al, 2006b ) and changes the scene for things to come.
Engulfed by a global mission and ignoring early warnings of limited consumer enthusiasm for gm food, available from Eurobarometer surveys (Gaskell et al., 1997) , the new Live Science sector and crop producers steam roll ahead. Imports of Monsanto's Round-up Ready gm soya into Europe from autumn 1996 onwards fall into a climate of opinion that creates an opportunity for issue entrepreneurs (Lassen et al, 2002 ). An EU regulatory loophole on food labelling allows the mobilisation of consumer and environmental concerns. What follows puts into doubt not only the agrochemical multinational MONSANTO, but the entire project of a 'Second Green (Bauer, 2006) .
As if gm crops do not make enough 'gene drama', in February 1997, the Scottish Roslin Institute announces, in a letter to Nature, the first successful cloning of an adult sheep some 18 month ago (Wilmut et al, 1997) . Photographs of Dolly the sheep gazing into the cameras travel fast and create concurrent world news. The story develops immediately into a moral outcry over the possibility of human cloning.
Ironically, the translation of 'adult nucleic transfer' into 'cloning', which offers a much richer anchor for social representations, does not come from the scientists but from Nature's own press release (Einsiedel et al, 2002) . The more recent controversy over stem cell cloning takes its impetus from the Dolly alarm and merges with the lingering awareness of human genome mapping which started in 1990 with very little public attention (Durant, Hansen & Bauer, 1996) .
Gm soya and the cloning of Dolly are watershed events in the public career of genetics during 1990s. Henceforth, public discourses split into 'green' agricultural biotechnology, sceptically observed, and 'red' biomedical biotechnology with moral questions but generally supported because it gives or save lives. The press measurably cultivated this separation (Bauer, 2002a and 2005) . The public deliberations of 'GM Nation' in 2002 are an expression of the split frame: debating GREEN conveniently focuses protest energies and shields RED from undue attention. vi This course of events has some similarity with the 1950s, when strategic efforts were made to split the public atom into a military and a civil nuclear power under the banner of 'Atoms for Peace' (Langer, 1995) . Weather this was, considering the techno-scientific infrastructure, a substantive or a rhetorical split preoccupies analysts ever since facing the issue of proliferation (Weiss, 2003) . The aftermaths of the 11 th of September 2001 brought to public attention that biotechnology might have a proliferation problem, too. However, significant by its absence, in our press corpus less than 0.5 percent of articles refer to a potential military uses of biotechnology, and all references predate the events of 2001.
vii
Conclusions: towards longitudinal comparative research
In this paper I distinguished two 25(+) year long phases, 1946-1972 and 1973-2002, in British public sentiments over genetics and biotechnology. Each phase comprises a wave of rising and declining enthusiasm. viii Several topics were identified that engaged public opinion through these phases of enthusiasm and concern. Scientists themselves raised the alarm on potential hazards of genetic engineering in mid 1970s, but with limited impact at the time. These concerns were crowded out by hype and enthusiasm for this strategic technology of the 21 st century. Twenty years later lingering concerns resurfaced and merged with others, such as food safety, globalisation and bioethics. This time round the public resonance was far greater.
Today, the actor-networks of rDNA and genomics engages debates over the safety of gm foods, the environmental soundness of gm crops, the corporate dominance over gm seeds and biodiversity, the patenting of life forms, the psychological and social consequences of genetic identity, the ethics of genetic testing, enhancement and embryonic stem cell cloning, the risks of xenotransplants, the prospects of individualised medicines and the reliability of DNA finger printing in a genetic information society.
Our data shows that the trend has changed towards a more sceptical public attitude to biotechnology, so much deplored in the 1990s, started in the press already in the mid 1980s, and was observable in public perceptions by mid 1990s. The public events of 1996/97 did not initiate this trend change, but catalysed it. They internationalised the debate and split it worldwide into a matter of either GREEN or RED biotechnology.
While corporate actors ignored early warnings, issue entrepreneurs successfully capitalised on the changing public sentiment and cornered the debate on GREEN biotechnology in Britain, probably to the relief of anybody working on RED biomedical biotechnology.
Under a long-term perspective, it is tempting to compare biotechnology to other technologies and their paths through public opinion. The source of historical analogy of genetic engineering will continue to preoccupy actors interested in technological futures. Is it the civil nuclear power, the hurdle of public opinion was raised some twenty years after a promising start in 1956; or is it the information technologies with its bubbling waves of new enthusiasms? I dare no prediction.
To tell the history of the public imagination of genetics is an historian's task. Jon Turney (1998) (large t) than few and far apart cross-sections (small t). In any problem area, curves
show best whether one is on the way into or on the way out of trouble. Some methodologists generally call for more continuous data streams in psychology and the social sciences to overcome much conceptual and methodological nonsense and to enhance causal understanding of processes (Fassnacht, 2000) . I concord.
A final comment on how unique this British story might be. Our past research has shown considerable divergence in timing and substance of the biotechnology debates, within Europe, across the Atlantic, and across the Americas (see Gaskell & Bauer, 2001 ). The global convergence on such matters is either wishful thinking or political agenda (see Jasanoff, 2005) . The international comparison of the representations of science and technology in the press must expect convergence and divergence. It is likely that the public take-off of modern biotechnology is a common feature.
However, the timing and the steadiness in increase of coverage during the 1980s, or the watershed years of 1996/97 leaves ample space for comparative puzzles.
Synchronicity is a criterion for an emergent trans-national public sphere, across Europe or globally. However, time is fractal and the particular time window of 'synchronicity' determines the conclusion (see for example Seifert, 2003) . These are eminently empirical questions that depend on the availability of comparable data streams. For the period after 1973, our mass media database covers eighteen different countries across Europe, North America, and Japan, and researchers are invited to consult, contribute and analyse this growing database. Let a thousand comparisons flourish ! A global public opinion of science and technology is in the making and the challenge is to track it as it happens.
